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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES F. TREES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. 
WALTER M. LEWIS, 
Defendant-Appellant 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO CROSS 
APPEAL OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDEtr 
Case No. 19333 
Contrary to Plaintiff-Respondent's (hereafter called Plaintiff 
Cross Appeal statement, Appellant was in no way aware, nor is he 
now aware, that he compel led Plaintiff Trees to purchase or "to be 
able to purchase" the DeMille property ancl in fact the Appellant 
specificially negates that representation. Trees entered into his 
purchase with the DeMi11es long before he enterecl into any negoiati 
with Appellant Lewis. There was no provision in the DeMi lle purchi 
which tied it to or made it subject to the purchase of the propert> 
of Appellant Lewis. The DeMille transaction was helcl up over an 
argument by the DeMille family that they wanted visitation rights 
to the family cemetery. Those rights were substantially reduced 
exchange for an additional sum of money paid by Trees to DeMilles 
The trial Court also negated that contention when it ruled that ~ 
Plaintiff had not presented a prima facie case. It is highly 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CO-VEST CORP., a Utah 
Corporation 
Plaintiff - Respondent 
vs 
BOYD CORBETT and KEITH GURR 
dba UTAH RANCHLANDS 
No: 19334 
Defendants - Appellants 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
The Defendants appeal from a ruling of the Fourth Judici~ 
District Court, wherein it was held that an agreement was intended 
to have been a receipt rather than a compromise and settlement of a~ 
earlier judgment awarded to the Plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Defendants filed a Motion for Stay of Execution and 
Relief of Judgment and Notice of Hearing. A_ hearinci was held before 
the Honorable Georoe E. Ballif, Judoe in the Fourth Judici1i 
District Court of Utah County, State of Utah. The lower court 
reviewed an instrument which was drafted by the Plaintiff's attorn''·' 
and signed by both parties. The lower court also listened 
t<:. testimony offered by Defendc>nt, Keith Gurr. The Plaintiff 
fYPS(;nted no evidence at the hearing, but relied on affidavits of 
its attorneys which had earlier been filed with the court. After 
review i no the evidence, the lower court ruled that the instrument 
was not prepared for the purpose of effecting a compromise and 
settlement of the judgment of Plaintiff, but was a receipt of monies 
received and a notation of a representation that certain other 
monies were coming in the future. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek to have the ruling reversed so as to allow the 
intent of the parties at the time the instrument was drafted to 
prevail. The Defendants' tendered performance will therefore fully 
and finally settle this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The matter in controversy revolves around an agreement to 
release the Defendants from a judgment awarded earlier to the Plain-
tiff. The Defendants had been subject to an action brought by the 
Plaintiff, Co-Vest Corp.. The judgment resulting from this action 
awarded the Plaintiff with $35 ,000 .00 which reflected an earlier 
payment of $1O,000. O O by the Defendants. Included in the awarded 
judgment was pre-judgmer.t interest even though the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law omitted any mention of such an award. 
Th€ pre-judgment interest amounted to $7 ,025.00. Althouoh not in 
1ss11e en this Appeal, this discrepancy served c>s part of the basiE 
for the agreement which is at issue. Fecord at 24. 
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On December 31, 1981, subseauent to the judament anrl prior 
to the aoreement at issue on this Appeal, the parties attorne11, 
entered into a settlement stipulation whereby the Defendants were tc 
initially pay $15,000.00 towards the judament with the remainder 
plus interest, due and payable on January 1, 1983. Rerorc1 at 14, 
Upon receiving the final payment, the Plaintiff was to file with the 
court a Satisfaction of Judoment. While there reriained some cues-
tion as to the authority of Defendants' attorney to enter into su~ 
an agreement, on January 20, 1982, Defendants paid Plaintiff 
$15,000.00. Record at 14. Due to a mistake in information receivec 
by Def end ant Keith Gurr regarding the tender i no of a diamond by 
Defendant Boyd Corbett for fin al paylilent, there Fas no payment mnoe 
on January 1, 1983. Record at 5. Plaintiff therefore souaht to 
enforce settlef"ent of the Judgment by initi2tinq a Sheriff's Sc>le of 
Defendant Keith Gurr's property. Record at 3. 
In order to terminate the Sheriff's Sale and to cause the 
Judgment to be fully satisfied as the settlement aoreement pre-
viously recuired, an agreement was entPred into on February 28, 
1983. Record at 16 This aqreement, the agreement at issue in this 
Appeal, was put in writing after the Defendant, Keith Gurr, visit~ 
with Plaintiff's attorney. Defendants did not have counsel pre· 
sent. The Plaintiff• s attorney draftPd the document and alona with 
the Defendant, Keith Gurr, accepted the document by c2usino hi.' 
signature to be placed thereon Record at 7. This instrument w2' 
entered as Defendants' Exhibit No. 1. 
The agreement provided that $20 ,000 .00 be paid immediately 
while the Sheriff's Sale would be terminated. It further provideo 
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·.tiat $10,000.00 would be paid subseauent to the release of certain 
pror•f'rties within the next few days. The releasing of the proper-
ties was necessary to allow the Defendants to close a sale on the 
properties and thereby make the final payments to the Plaintiff. 
Pecord at 8 and 15. The agreement finally provided that with the 
final payment of $5,000.00, to be paid within 45 days, there was to 
be cicknowledaed a "full and final settlement". Record at 8. 
Defendants paid the $20 ,000 .00 while Plaintiff terminated the 
sheriff's Sale and thereafter released the certain properties. 
Defendants subsequently closed the sale of the released properties 
and on March 9, 198 3, obtained a cashier's check in the amount of 
$15,000.00 made payable to Plaintiff's attorney. Record at 10. 
This check was taken by the Defendant, Keith Gurr, to his attorney 
to make sure the matter was closed. Defendants' attorney contacted 
Plaintiff's attorney with the final payment. Payment was refused. 
Record at 11. The $15,000.00 was subseauently placed with the 
rourt. Record at 11. 
The Plaintiff again proceeded with the Sheriff's Sale. 
Defendants thereafter filed their Motion for Stay of Execution and 
Relief from Judgment and Notice of Hearing. The Defendants con-
tended that the agreement amounted to an accord and satisfaction. 
Record at 3. The Plaintiff countered by claiming, in it's 
affidavits, that a mistake was made in the figures represented. The 
1r11ctake resulted because only a cursory examination of the Plain-
1 lff 's file was made at the time the agreement ~as drafted. Record 
at 28. The Plaintiff further contended that there had been no 




DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT NO. 1 WITH ITS 
SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES, CLEARLY 
ESTABLISHES AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
The lower court ruled that the Defendants' Exhibit No. 1, was 
not prepared for the purpose of effecting an accord and satisfacti~ 
of the judgment of the Plaintiff in this matter. In so rulina, the 
lower court has disreaarded previous decisicns made by this court. 
In Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P2d 1369 (Utah 
198 0) , th is court ruled th at an accord and sat is fact ion was en-
forceable in a factual pattern very similar to the case on appeal. 
A judgment debtor was seeking relief from a judament which had be~ 
awarded to the judgment creditor two ye2rs earlier. The relief 
sought by the judgrr,ent debtor was based en an agreement reached by 
the parties wherein the judgment creditor would recive a sum leso 
than the total amount, in full satisfaction of the judgmePt. The 
judgment creditor later claimed the agreement to be invalid. The 
court, finding the agreement to be valid, set out the elements 
essential to the validity of such an agreement: 
1. A proper subject matter; 
2. Competent parties; 
3. An assent or meeting of the minds; 
4. A consideration given for the accord. 
While it we>s the element of consideration which the judqwer' 
creditor claimed ..,as lackina, the courts e>pproach offers insight" 
to how agreements which compromise original claims are looked upor. 
-s-
the majority of Courts. In determining that there was consider-
·,tJ'· ''present, the court noted that wherever possible such aoree-
,11ent.s should be upheld. This, according to the court, has been the 
,,0 dern trend. 
Al though courts look upon such agreements with favor, to 
e't2bl1sh the existence of the element of assent, it must clearly 
appear to the court that the parties so understood and entered into 
a new and substituted agreement. Messek v. PHD Truckino Service, 
~ , 6 1 5 P 2 d 1 2 7 6 ( U t ah 1 9 8 0 ) , _T_a_t_e_s~, _I_n_c'-'--. _v..o.--'L"-1::.' ~t.::t.::1-'e'--,A'-"m=e.::r-=ic.:c:..:a=­
Ref in in q Co., 535 P2d 1228. In Tates, the court was faced with 
three propositions put forward to show there was assent: a con-
versation, a letter, and the cashing of a check. Because of the 
lack of any definite aoreement, expressed or inferred, in any of thP. 
communications, the court found that there was no clear assent. The 
court thought it sionificant that words equivalent to "payment in 
full" were not used in the communications. 
In the present case, Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, was presented 
to the lower court to show that a definite agreement had been 
reached by th<> parties. This agreerr.ent, at least in part, was 
executory in nature. The final $15,000.00 was promised to be paid 
upon the release of certain properties and the acknowldoedment that 
there was a "full and final settlement". The promise to pay the 
~'15, oou. 00 in exchange for the promise to acknowledge a full and 
1 inaJ s2tisfaction was the Defendants7 offer. The Plaintiff's 
'!Qnature was the acceptance of that offer. The lancrnaoe of the 
instrument is clear and unambiguous. It clearly shows that an 
agreement to settle the matter had been reached by the parties. 
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The assent of the Plaintiff is made even more clear l>y the 
surrounding circumstances before and at the time the document 
drafted. The agreement was drafted in the Plaintiff's attorne·;', 
office by that attorney. The languaqe used reflected Defendarto' 
offer clearly and if the Plaintiff's attorney did not intend tc 
accept such an offer, he would not have s ianed the document. "' 
clearly would have avoided using language such as "full anc1 final 
settlement". Furthermore, the use of such lanouaae is a sionifi-
cant factor which the lower court should have placed more weiqht 
upon. 
The circumstances prior to the drafting of the instrumen'. 
clearly infer that the intent of the meetino which led to th; 
drafting of the instrument was to effect a final settlement of the 
matter. This agreement, while based on the earlier jud9ment, 
resulted from a settlement stipulation wherein Defendants' attorney 
promised that the judgment would be pcdd in full as of January I, 
1983. When the settlement stipulation was not met, the Plaintiff 
sought to enforce it through a Sheriff's Sale. It is clec>r frorr 
these surrounding facts th at the Plaintiff intended a set tlewent of 
the matter as much as did the Defendant. 
Given the clear lancrnage of the agreement with its signatures 
and given the surrounding circumstances, it is clearly apparent thac 
the parties so understood and entered into a new and substitutf 
agreement. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF'S AVOIDANCE OF 
THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. -
While the Defendants clearly established an accord and satis-
,,crt 1,,n, the Plaintiff failed to avoid the Defendants' contentions 
,,v ,,!ear 0nd convincing evidence. It was stated in Reliable 
rcrniture Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 93, 466 P2d 
168, at 369 (1970), that: 
"Where a person (the Plaintiff) has in writina 
accepted a settlement of a disputed claim the 
effect is an accord and satisfaction, the avoid-
ance of which rquires clear and convincina 
evidence." 
The Plaintiff's avoidance of the accord and satisfaction is 
based on the mistake of the Plaintiff's attorney as to the amount 
left owina. The figure of $35,000.00 in the aoreement, according to 
the Plaintiff's Affidavit, was in error as it resulted from a 
cursory examination of the Plaintiff's file. There was no other 
evidence offered at the hearing to support Plaintiff's contention of 
rr1stake. The most that the Plaintiff's avoidance c'loes, is to raise 
the cues ti on of whether there was assent. Plaintiff's contentions 
are not supported by evidence which is clear and convincing. 
Therefore, the lower court erred by allowina the Plaintiff to avoid 
the accord it had worked out with the Defendant. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY 
CONSTRUED THE TERMS OF THE 
AGREEMENT. 
The lower court improperly construed the terms of the excutory 
cc,rd in at least two ways. First, it allowed extrinsic evidence 
to be considered when the instrument was clear and unambiauous. 
-8-
Second, when it allowed extrinsic evidence to interpret the con-
tract, it failed to interpret the terms strictly against the Plain-
tiff, who, through its attorney, drafted the agreement. 
An executory accord has been defined as an agreement that 
an existing claim shall be discharged in the future by the rendition 
of a substituted performance. Lawrence Construction Co. v. 
Holmquist, 642 P2d 382, (Utah 1982). In Lawrence the court further 
stated: 
"In our view, the prior agreement was an 
executory accord and as such constitute, 
a valid enforcable contract. An accord 
is an agreement between the parties, one 
to give or perform, the other to receive 
or accept, such offered payment or per-
formance in satisfaction of a claim." 
As the executory accorcl becomes a valid enforcable contract, it 
becomes subject to basic contract principles. These principles 
require that the intent of the parties should first be ascertained 
from the four corners of the instrument itself. Only if the in-
strument is unclear or ambiguous should extrinsic evidence be 
allowed. And even then, only if the ambiguity cannot be reconcil~ 
from a reasonable interpretation. Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. 
Bybee, Utah 2d ,306 P2d 773, (1957). The purpose is to 
protect the sanctity of the writing. Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 
616 P2d 1060, (Utah 1981). 
This basic rule should have been followed by the lower court. 
The instrument was clear and any ambiguity which may have exist«; 
could have reasonably been resolved from a reasonable interpretati~ 
of the terms used, such as "full and final satisfaction". 
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Even if there was ambiguity in the instrument that could not be 
reasonably reconciled, the lower court erred by its failure to 
strictly construe the language of the instrument against the Plain-
tiff. In Continental, supra, one of the parties who was an attorney 
drafted the agreement. As the party was the draftsman and an 
attorney, the court held that the proper construction of the in-
strument should be strictly against him. 
In the present case, the Plaintiff's attorney is the one who 
drafted the instrument. Any construction of the instrument should 
be strictly construed against the Plaintiff. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ESTOPPED 
FROM DENYING SATISFACTION OF 
THE DEFFNDANT 
In Suaarhouse FinancP Co. v. Anderson, 610 P2d 1369 (Utah 
1980), the court stated: 
"We note, in addition, that this jurisdiction 
recognizes the doctrine of promissory estoppel, 
whereby an individual who has made a promise 
which the individual should reasonably expect 
to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does 
induce such action or forbearance is estopped 
to deny or repudiate the promise should the 
promise or some third party suffer detriment 
thereby." 
Part of the reason for the agreement in question was to allow 
'·' tili.n properties of the Defendants to be released from Plaintiff's 
Upon the release of the properties, Defendants would then 
effect their sale to a third party buyer. From those proceeds, 
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Defendants could then make a final settlement of the matter. 
initial payment of $20,000.00 made at the time of the agreement 
with the understanc'ing of the Plaintiff that the payment was pos-
sible only if the properties were released. It was further known by 
the Plaintiff that the release of the properties and their sub-
sequent sale would allow the Defendants to pay an additional and 
final $15,000.00. Plaintiff by its actions, re2sonably expected to 
induce the Defendant to pay $J5,000.00 within a short period of 
time: $20,000.00 immediately, $10,000.00 in "a few days", and an 
additional $5,000.00 within 45 days. BecausP of Plaintiff's initial 
inducements to settle the matter, the Defendant paid $20 ,000.00 
immediately and negotiated the sale of the released propertiEs. 
Defendant therefore has suffered detriment for the benefit of the 
Plaintiff. As a result, the Plaintiff should be estopped from 
denying the Defendants satisfaction of the accord. 
CONCLUSION 
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